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Samaritan versus rotten kid: another look

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Dijkstra, Bouwe R.

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-199506

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Abstract We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents. The Samaritan's dilemma (rotten kid theorem) states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after (before) the altruist. We find that in general, the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent's action marginally affects only his own payoff. The altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff.
Klassifikation Volkswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter Altruism; Rotten kid theorem; Samaritan's dilemma
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2007
Seitenangabe S. 91-110
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64 (2007) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.006
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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