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Samaritan versus rotten kid: another look

[journal article]

Dijkstra, Bouwe R.

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Abstract We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents. The Samaritan's dilemma (rotten kid theorem) states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after (before) the altruist. We find that in general, the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent's action marginally affects only his own payoff. The altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff.
Classification Political Economy
Free Keywords Altruism; Rotten kid theorem; Samaritan's dilemma
Document language English
Publication Year 2007
Page/Pages p. 91-110
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64 (2007) 1
Status Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)