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Samaritan versus rotten kid: another look
[journal article]
Abstract We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents. The Samaritan's dilemma (rotten kid theorem) states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after (before) the altruist. We find that in general, the altruist can reach her fir... view more
We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents. The Samaritan's dilemma (rotten kid theorem) states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after (before) the altruist. We find that in general, the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent's action marginally affects only his own payoff. The altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff.... view less
Classification
Political Economy
Free Keywords
Altruism; Rotten kid theorem; Samaritan's dilemma
Document language
English
Publication Year
2007
Page/Pages
p. 91-110
Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64 (2007) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.006
Status
Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)