Download full text
(420.0Kb)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-113168
Exports for your reference manager
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract "In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in... view more
"In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable." (author's abstract)... view less
"Die Autoren untersuchen Kollusion in Märkten, in denen die einzige strategische Variable der Akteure ihre Ortswahl ist. Für Spiele in k-dimensionalen Euklidischen Räumen mit massepunktfreien Verteilungen zeigen sie, dass Kollusion nur profitabel sein kann, wenn wenigstens die Hälfte aller Akteure k... view more
"Die Autoren untersuchen Kollusion in Märkten, in denen die einzige strategische Variable der Akteure ihre Ortswahl ist. Für Spiele in k-dimensionalen Euklidischen Räumen mit massepunktfreien Verteilungen zeigen sie, dass Kollusion nur profitabel sein kann, wenn wenigstens die Hälfte aller Akteure kolludieren. Für Wettbewerb auf dem Einheitsintervall, dem Einheitskreis und dem Einheitsquadrat etablieren die Autoren hinreichende Bedingungen für die Profitabilität von Kollusion." (Autorenreferat)... view less
Keywords
location; competition; market mechanism; theory; profit principle; model construction
Classification
Political Economy
Method
theory formation; basic research
Document language
English
Publication Year
2002
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
12 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, 02-22
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
Data providerThis metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne