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On the profitability of collusion in location games

Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen
[working paper]

Huck, Steffen; Knoblauch, Vicki; Müller, Wieland

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-113168

Further Details
Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract "In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable." (author's abstract)

"Die Autoren untersuchen Kollusion in Märkten, in denen die einzige strategische Variable der Akteure ihre Ortswahl ist. Für Spiele in k-dimensionalen Euklidischen Räumen mit massepunktfreien Verteilungen zeigen sie, dass Kollusion nur profitabel sein kann, wenn wenigstens die Hälfte aller Akteure kolludieren. Für Wettbewerb auf dem Einheitsintervall, dem Einheitskreis und dem Einheitsquadrat etablieren die Autoren hinreichende Bedingungen für die Profitabilität von Kollusion." (Autorenreferat)
Keywords profit principle; market mechanism; competition; theory; model construction; location
Classification Political Economy
Method basic research; theory formation
Document language English
Publication Year 2002
City Berlin
Page/Pages 12 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, 02-22
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
data provider This metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne